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PUBLIC  POLICY  AND ECONOMIC  GROWTH: 
DEVELOPING  NEOCLASSICAL  IMPLICATIONS 
ABSTRACT 
Why do the countries  of  the world  display  considerable  disparity  in long 
term growth  rates?  This paper  examines  the hypothesis  that  the answer  lies in 
differences  in national  public  policies  which affect  the incentives  that 
individuals  have to accumulate  capital  in  both its physical  and human  forms. 
Our analysis  shows  that these incentive  effects can induce  large difference  in 
long  run growth  rates.  Since many  of the key tax rates are difficult  to 
measure,  our procedure  is an indirect  one  We work within  a calibrated,  two 
sector  endogenous  growth  model,  which has its origins  in the microeconomic 
literature  on human capital formation.  We show  that national  taxation  can 
substantially  affect  long  run growth  rates.  In  particular,  for small open 
economies  with substantial  capital mobility,  national  taxation can readily  lead 
to "development  traps"  (in which  countries  stagnate  or  regress)  or to "growth 
miracles"  (in which  countries  shift  from  little growth  to rapid  expansion) 
This influence  of taxation on the rate of economic  growth  has important  welfare 
implications:  in basic  endogenous  growth  models,  the welfare  cost of a 10 % 
increase  in the rate of  income tax can  be 40 times  larger  than in  the basic 
neoclassical  model. 
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Economists  have long suspected  that  there  is a link between  national 
policies and long term rates  of economic  growth.  For example, Schultz [1981] 
suggests  that many public  policies contain  disincentives  for growth  because 
they reduce  the rewards to accumulation  of a comprehensive  concept of capital 
encompassing  human as well as physical capital.  In this  paper, ye show that 
a basic Schultzian  model  has the property that modest variations in tax rates 
are associated  with large variations in long  run growth rates.  Our  model 
follows leads  provided by Uzawa  [1965],  Lucas  [1988b],  and Rebelo [1987].  In 
our analysis,  changes in public policy can  potentially explain periods of 
secular stagnation or high economic  growth.  Public policy  is particularly 
powerful  in affecting small  open  economies with freely mobile capital.  For 
these economies,  taxes  can  easily  shut  down the growth  process, leading  to 
"development  traps  in which countries  stagnate  or even regress  for  lengthy 
periods. 
The  specific model  that we construct belongs to an important  class of 
endogenous growth models based on work by Uzawa [1965]  and retains the 
following  key proper-ties on the basic neoclassical  model of  Solow [1956] 
Swan [1963], Cass  [19651, and Xoopmans [1965]:  Ci)  the existence  of a 
constant  asymptotic growth rate;  and (ii)  competitive  and optimal allocations 
coincide in the absence  of public interventions,  The crucial  attribute  of 
this class of o-dels is that ther. is a "core"  of capital  goods which  can be 
produced  without  the direct  or indirect  contribution  of non—reproducible 
factors. 
In developing  our model we begin with  the analysis  of individual 
decisions  at given prices  and then consider  the implications  of production 
structure.  This path leads  us to develop aspects  of individual  accumulation technology  not present in earlier stndies  that  were concerned  with aggregai. 
behavior.  We then examine  the relation  between public  policy and long tern 
growth,  restricting the models parameters  to accord with existing 
mjcroeconomic  and macroeconomic  evidence,  a methodology that has proven to 
provide  a powerful  organizing tool in other areas  of research on aggregate 
behavior.2  - 
Our  analysis  focuses exclusively  on taxation of coodity outputs.  We 
have chosen to focus on taxation of this form since  we  think that a variety 
of public  interventions—including aspects of property rights enforcement  and 
regulation—may be described in this manner,  so that our conclusions  can 
potentially  be interpreted  as bearing  on other  aspects of governmental 
activity. 
Our investigation of the link between public policy and  economic  growth 
is organized  as follows.  Section II provides  a  brief overview  of the basic 
neoclassical  model and of a very simple  endogenous  growth  model.  Both models 
are calibrated to accord  with long run evidence  for the U.S. economy and then 
used to analyze  the effects of taxation  on real economic activity. 
Section III develops  our  model of growth through human capital 
accumulation  and the incentive  effects of public  policy  on this process.  Our 
analysis  proceeds  in three  stages.  Following  Rosen [1976) and Beckman 
[1976]  ,  we  discuss  optimal individual  accumulation  of human capital  and the 
influence  of various  taxes  on optimal  accumulation.  To highlight  the role of 
taxes and  to conform to prior  microeconom.ic studies, our analysis begins  by 
taking  the following  key prices  to be exogenous:  the wage rate per unit of 
human  capital;  the  price  of  investing  in  human  capital;  and  the  real  interest 
rate  on  consution  loans.  In the next  two stages  of model development  we 
add the structure  that makes these  relative  prices endogenous.  First, we 3 
study the production  of consumption  and investment  goods,  while retaining  an 
exogenous  borrowing  and lending rate.  This provides  a framework  for 
discussing  a smell  open economy's accumulation  of nontraded  human capital.  In 
this section,  the nature of the influence  of tax policies on the price of 
investing  in human capital  is shown  to depend  on the nature of the technology 
for producing such  investments. Second,  we describe  a full general 
equilibrium  in which  the rate  of return  adjusts  to equate  borrowing  and 
lending  or,  equivalently,  savings  and investment.  The influence  of policy  on 
the rate of return  is a final  factor  affecting  the growth rate. 
Section  IV compares the welfare  effects of taxation in three  economies: 
the basic neoclassical  model, the simple  endogenous growth model discussed in 
Section II, and the growth model that  we propose  in section III.  The  main 
conclusion obtained from this comparison is that there are larger  welfare 
costs of taxation in endogenous growth models than in comparable neoclassical 
models  with exogenous  technical change.  Fundamentally,  this is because 
policy  can influence  the long  run growth  rate in endogenous  growth  models.  A 
concluding  section sumaarizes  our results  and relates them  to ongoing 
research  on the theory  of econoic  growth. 
II.  leoclassical  odela of Ecooic Growth:  Old  and I. 
When we think about  .conoic growth,  most of us have in the back of  our 
minds some variant  of the basic  neoclassical  model  of capital accumulation 
due to Solo, [1956],  Swan [1963), Cass [1965), and Koopmans [1965).  In this 
paper we construct  and evaluate  a new neoclassical  model that alters 
intertemporal  technology  in ways which  make sustainable  growth  a feasible 
outcome when technology  is time stationary.  Before  developing  our specific 
model it is useful  to briefly discuss stylized  versions of old and new 4 
neoclassical  models  of economic  growth.  These two models  have the same 
specification  of preferences  over consumption  (Cr)  so we begin with these:3 
U  E  (C  —  1)  for 0  a.  (11.1) 
With this utility function  constant  growth  in consumption  is optimal  if the 
real interest  rate is constant  over  time,  which we take  as one of the 
"stylized  facts"  of economic  development  (see Kaldor [1961] and P.omer 
[1988a]).  As in most of the growth  literature  we will assume  that per capita 
labor supply  is inelastic  at L  To silify the exposition  we abstract  from 
population  growth. 
11.1  The Basic Jeoclassical Nodel 
In this economy there is a single  good  that is  produced by combining 
physical capital (Kt) and labor  according  to a neoclassical  production 
function  F(.)4: 
F(K,NX).  (11.2) 
Technological  progress occurs  at an exogenous rate and its effects on 
productivity are captured by the variable  which grows at the "gross" rate  , X 
=  X1 
We  assume that technical  progress is labor—augmenting  to 
ensure that steady—state  growth is feasible (see Swan  [1963] and Phelps 
[1966]) 
The resource constraint on consumption and investment  and the 
difference equation that describes the accumulation  of physical  capital 
colete the specification of the technology. 
Ct 
+ It  (11.3) =  + 
(1_.5)K  (11.4) 
As usual, 5 denotes the rate of depreciation  which is assumed  to be between 
zero  and one. 
In this economy there are two  ndes of economic grovth.  First,  in the 
steady state, consumption,  investment, output and capital  all grow at rate 
Second, from a low initial level of the capital stock, the economy may 
exhibit  growth  rates exceeding  i' during  a  transition period in which the 
economy  converges  to its steady—state  growth  path.  In a companion  paper 
(King and Rebelo  [1989])  we  argue that the transitional dynamics of the 
neoclassical  model cannot  account for much sustained variation in rates  of 
economic  growth—either across countries  or tine periods—without  generating 
counterfactual  implications for factor prices  or factor shares, 
Calibrating  the Model 
To  study  the  effects  of  taxation  in  the  neoclassical  model  it  is  useful 
to  calibrate  it  with  parameters  that  accord  with  the U.S long term 
experience. We will use the parameters  of the baseline  economy studied in 
our companion paper  (King and Rebelo  [1989]) which contains  a detailed 
discussion  of the dels  calibration. Each  time period is taken  to represent 
a year and the discount  factor  is chosen  so that the after—tax  steady—state 
interest  rate is 3.2%.  Momentary  utility  is  taken  to  be  logarithmic  (o=1). 
The production  function  is assumed  to be Cobb—Douglas,  F(K,N)AKlNa. We 
normalize  A=1, which is a choice  of units for  measuring  output,  and select  a 
conventional  value for labors share (2/3).  Finally,  we set the 
depreciation  rate  equal  to  10?.  (5..10), the growth  rate of technical progress 
to 27, 
('y1  i.02),  and the fraction  of time devoted  to work to 20%  (?fr.20). 6 
The  Effects  of  Taxation 
Throughout  the  paper,  the  main  tax  experiment  that  we consider  is  an 
unanticipated  increase  in  the output/income  tax rate—applied equally to all 
sectoral  activities—from 20% to 30%.  Roughly,  this difference  represents  a 
change  from  the average  Japanese  tax rate during 1965—1975  to the average 
U.S.  tax rate over that  period.  (Atkinson  and Stiglitz t1980, Figure  1—2], 
provide this measure of the average  tax rate—tax  revenues as a share  of 
gross  domestic  product—for a number  of countries).7 
To isolate  the effects  of taxation  from those  of government  expenditures 
we assume  that the tax revenue is used to finance lu  sum  transfer payments. 
Within the basic  neoclassical  model,  as is well known,  an increase  in the 
income  tax rate occasions  a shift  in the level  of the steady—state  path—but 
not in its slope—and  sets in motion  transitional  dynamics.  For our 
calibrated  economy,  the steady—state  effects of an increase  in the rate of 
income  tax from 20% to 30'!.  are a 18.2%  drop in the capital stock and a  3.6% 
drop in consution.  The dynamics  that characterize  the transition  between 
the two  steady states  are depicted in Figure 1,  where the dashed line 
represents  the old steady—state path.  The  qualitative features of these 
dynamics are familiar: during the transition period the initial  level of 
consumption rises in response to the tax increase  so the economy  "works off' 
the capital stock  through lower  net investment  and temporarily  high levels  of 
consumption. 
11.2  4.  Sip1e feocla.ssical  Ilodel  of Endogenous  Growth 
For organizing our thinking about economic growth it is useful to 
consider the simplest endogenous growth model.  In this  model all factors of 7 
production  are reproducible and their quantity  is summarized  by the coosite 
capital  good K*.  The production  technology  is given  by 
= A  K,  (11.2)' 
where  k>O is the time invariant  productivity  parameter.  The resource  and 
accumulation  constraints are 
(11.3) 
*  K*  1*  6K  t  t t  II. 
It is easy to show that the con growth rate of  consumption,  investment, 
output and capital in this economy is: 
= [()](1/)  (11.5) 
In this expression we  have  defined  Mr)  = [(1—r)A+i--6] as the gross private 
rate of return to the coosite capital good.  Thus, in an application of 
standard Fisherian principles, the growth rate depends on the gap between the 
rate  of interest  and the rate of time preference,  with  the strength  of this 
relation  depending on the intertemporal  elasticity  of substitution  (1/a). 
Calibrating  the Model 
We parameterize  this economy  to make it cona.rable  to the basic 
neoclassical xdel  just discussed. We choose o1, 5.1O and determine  the 
values  of /3 and  A such that the economy grows at 2?.  a year and has an annual 
alter—tax  real interest  rate of 3.2?. when the rate  of income  tax is 20?..8 8 
Effects of Taxation 
As is clear from  expression (11.5), an unanticipated  increase  in the tax 
rate  r produces  an iediate  shift  in the level  and slope of the growth 
path—there are no transitional  dynamics.  Higher taxes work to lower  the 
rate of return,  R(r),  and thus  to lower  the reward  to accuilation.  A rise 
in the tax rate thus lovers  the long  run growth  rate,  which is a  general 
characteristic  of endogenous  growth  models  stressed  by Rebelo [1987]  The 
effects  of increasing  the rate of income  tax from 20% to 30% on consumption 
and capital  are represented in Figure 2.  The economys rate of growth  falls 
from 2% to 0.37% (in Table 4  this is reported as a decline of 1.63% in the 
growth rate).  The reduction  in investment  associated  with  this slowdown 
makes the initial  level  of consumption  rise by 36%. 
We think  that this model is a useful  starting  point for consideration  of 
the effects  of policy  on long  term growth.  However,  in a strict 
interpretation  of K, it delivers endogenous  long run growth only by 
effectively  ignoring  labor input, which is the sole force inducing 
diminishing  returns to capital in the basic technology of Solow [1956] and 
Swan [1963]  .  (Alternatively if  is viewed as  a composite of physical and 
human capital then the assumption  is that these are produced  according to  an 
identical technology.)  In our analysis  below,  we will follow Lucas  [1988b] 
in permitting  labor input to be reproducible, i.e., permitting  human capital 
accumulation.  Then,  we can reintroduce  the smooth  substitution  between 
factor inputs  that was a key motivation  for Solow's  [1956) specification  of 
production  technology. 9 
III.  Economic  Growth  through Human  Capital Accuilat  ion 
Our interest is in models of endogenous  growth that  accord  with the major 
facts  of economic  development.  One stylized  fact is that  national  growth 
rates  do not display trends  in the absence of major policy  interventions. 
Another  is that there is little  evidence  of long run trends  in real  interest 
rates.  Following  Solow  [1970),  we interpret  these observations as evidence 
that  steady—state  models are a reasonable first approximation  to reality,  and 
we  focus on economies in which the real interest  rate is constant  along 
steady—state paths.  We  therefore  require that the production of both 
physical and human capital goods is governed by constant returns to scale 
technologies so that there are feasible steady—state  growth paths.  We  also 
continue to utilize the preferences described in (11.1) since these  lead 
individuals  to choose  a constant  growth of  consumption when faced  with a 
constant interest rate. 
The model economy  that we construct is thus  of the class studied 
previously by Uzawa  [1965),  Lucas  [1988b]  and Rebelo  [1987) in that it 
highlights the societal allocation of resources between current  consumption 
and comprehensive accumulation  (physical and human capital) under constant 
returns to scale.  However,  our model  is different in three respects from 
these  earlier studies.  First, in contrast  to Uzawa and Lucas,  we allow for a 
commodity input  into the production of new human capital, which  seems 
empirically  reasonable given  our broad interpretation of this process.  In 
this regard,  we  are also motivated by the analysis of  Rebelo  [1987),  which 
indicated  that the Uzawa—Lucas  specification restricts certain tax policies 
to have negligible effect on the steady—state growth rate.  Second,  since  we 
want to understand Ci)  the decentralization of accumulation  decisions and 
(ii)  growth in an open  economy with traded physical capital and nontraded human capital,  we require that the rate of human capital investment  be 
subject  to diminishing  point—in—time  returns  as in Rosen t1976]  .  Third,  our 
del  is designed to permit a quantitative  evaluation  of the effects of 
policy on economic growth. 
III.  I  The Core Eleeuts 
To study  the accumulation  of physical  and human capital,  we use a two 
sector  endogenous  growth  model.  As in the neoclassical  model  of the previous 
section,  there is a single  consu.tion/physical investment  good.  This good 
is produced  in sector  1 according  to a constant  returns—to—scale  production 
technology  with  physical and  human capital  as its inputs.  Rence,  one 
technical  coustraint  for the economy  is 
+  = Ylt = Fi(KI,NitHt).  (111.1) 
As previously, C  and  denote  consuntion and physical investment. Dutput 
of this commodity  is Y1  and physical  capital  and labor (human  capital) 
inputs  into  this sector  are denoted  respectively  by K1 
and 
The human capital investment  good,  which  we call 1Ht'  is produced in the 
second  sector  with another  production  technology  that is constant  returns  to 
scale in  the two inputs,  i.e., 
'Mt  '2  F2(X2, N2H).  (111.2) 
The physical capital  goods are taken  to obey standard  neoclassical 
accumulation  equations,  i.e., 
—  = I 
— fi  (111.3) where  is the depreciation  rate in sector  j.  Aggregate  physical capital 
investment  is then the sum of  the sectoral  investments,  i.e., 1  11t2t' 
Our specification of the evolution  of human capital  embodies  diminishing 





— 5Ht,  (111.4) 
with D8 > 0  and  <  This specification  of 'adjustment  costs"  permits 
steady—state  growth  and Ht  grow at the same rate.  Further, combined 
with (111.2),  our  setup  is consistent  with the viev that growth in human 
capital  combines  labor  and other inputs  according  to a production function as 
in Hecan  [1976].  We assume  that  both physical  and human capital investment 
are irreversible. 
Finally,  the sectoral  allocations  of labor  must sum to the available 
stock,  N. 
+ N2 ￿ N  (11L5) 
Since  human capital  is embodied  in workers time,  this allocation  also 
determines  the sectoral  allocation  of human  capital. 
With this specification of interteoral  technology,  our model has a 
range  of feasible  balanced growth  equilibria  in which consution, physical 
investment,  sectoral  outputs,  and capital stocks  all grow at the same rate; 
this rate,  which we denote  by ''H' 
is the human  capital growth rate. 
Calibrating  the Model 
Our  objective  is to explore  the quantitative  effects of  ta.x policies on 
rates  of economic  growth.  For this  purpose,  we need to specify  aspects  of 
the investment  technologies  (parameters  of the 8  function, 5M' 12 
production technologies  (parameters  of the functions  F1 and F2); and tax 
structure.  Our  parameter selections are reported in Table  1. 
Throughout our  analysis,  we concentrate  on the case where  the production 
functions  F1 and 
F2 are Cobb—Douglas,  with F 
= AK1°1  (NH)i. 
We 
uniformly  assume  that the share  of labor  in sector  1 
(or) is  2/3,  so that our 
results  are compatible  with those  for the neoclassical  model  discussed  above. 
Further,  as in section  II, we normalize  the constant  term in the sector  1 
production  function to unity (A1  1) which,  as earlier, represents  a choice 
of units.  In our quantitative  analysis,  we assume  that there is a uniform 
depreciation  rate  on physical  capital  in its two uses,  5K1 
= 
5K2 
=  .10. 
The  parameter  choices  for  sector  1  are well within  the range of 
selections  studied in other settings,  such as public  finance, quantitative 
growth  theory,  and business cycle  analysis.  However,  in specifying  the human 
capital  production  process, there  is less  guidance  from prior aggregative 
studies.  We consequently  start  with  a benchmark  view that  human capital 
production  is not much different  from the production  of output,  so that 2 
= 
= 2/3 and  = 
ox 
=  .10.  This set of parameter choices  has the convenient 
implication  that  there are no transitional dynamics in response  to tax 
changes  if these  are uniform across the sectors.  Rather, both capital 
goods—K  and H—simply  grow  forever at the new steady—state  rate, as in the 
simple del of section II.  This  implication is independent  of the choice  of 
the e function; it holds generally if the two sectoral production  functions 
are the same. 
There has been little research  since that of Rosen  [1976] on the 
estimation of the parameters of the e function, which is a primary 
determinant  of the rate of  human  capital  accumulation.  We  employ a 
parameterization of the human capital  accumulation  technology which implies that:  (i) human capital declines at the depreciation  rate if there is no 
investment  expenditure (e(O)O);  and (ii) there are locally no "adjustment 
costs"  at zero  gross investment  so that De(111/H)  I at I 
= 0.  The 
specific function  we use is 
1  9 
ec111/H) 
=  + 9i)9  —  (111.6) 
Our benchmark  assumption is that  the parameter 9 takes  on the value .5. 
To conduct  quantitative  experiments  within  our general equilibrium  model, 
it is also necessary  to specify  aspects  of preferences—,3  and c—since  these 
influence  the equilibrium  interest  and growth  rates.  Our procedure  is as 
follows:  we choose  a value of the intertenporal  elasticity  of substitution 
in consumption  (i/c)  and a baseline  value for the after—tax  interest  rate 
R(r)  and growth  rate .  Then, we can compute  two  "uniovns"  in the model, 
the utility discount  factor  fi and  the  productivity  parameter  for sector  2 
output,  A2.  The former  is pinned  down by the Fisberian  link  between interest 
and consumption  growth, /3(7N)R(r)l; the latter  is determined  by the 
required  growth  rate given efficient  factor input proportions. Fixing  these 
parameters,  we then explore  how steady—state  interest  rates  and growth  rates 
vary as the tax structure is  altered.'1  Our benchmark  preference  case is to 
assume that the intertemporal  elasticity  of substitution is unity (1/c  = 1). 
Finally,  as in section  II, we use the after—ta.x steady—state  real interest 
rate of 32 and growth rate 27,. 
Seiisztzvy Analysis:  Given our uncertainty  about the values of the human 
capital  production technology, we  looked  at the implications  of alternative 
parameter  values, suggested  by prior theory  or measurement,  which would  act 
to reduce  the growth implications  relative  to our benchmark.  First,  the 
tizawa  [1965)—Lucas  [1988b) specification  is that only  labor is used to 14 
produce  the human capital  investment  good (021). 
This parameterization  has 
the very special  property  that taxation  of sector  1 output  has no effect  on 
the economys steady—state  growth  rate.  Consequently,  we study  the 
implications  of increasing  our choice  of 2  from  our benchmark  of .67 to a 
level  of .95,  Second,  in  the applied  labor economics  literature,  there  is a 
variety of evidence  on the magnitude  of the depreciation  of human capital: 
Mincer's  [1974] estimate  of  .012 for individuals  is the lowest  one that 
we found; Haley [1976] reports  estimates  in the range of 3 to 4%.  In our 
sensitivity  analysis,  we reduce  to Mincer's value.  Third, reasoning  that 
increasing  "adjustment  costs"  would  mitigate  the sensitivity  of growth  to 
economic  policy, we reduce  0 to  .25.  Fourth,  we explored  the implications  of 
a value of u that implies  a smaller  degree  of intertemporal  substitution 
(o'=5).  Table 1 provides  a  summary  of the parameterizations  that we consider. 
Taxation  of the Two Sectors 
Throughout  the analysis,  we consider  taxation  of sectoral  outputs at 
rates  with the proceeds  rebated lump  sum.  As in the basic  neoclassical 
del  of section  II, with constant  returns—to—scale  technologies  this is 
equivalent  to taxing  the incomes  from all factor  services  allocated  to sector 
j at the uniform rate r. 
III. 2  Individual  Human  Capital Lccuulation 
We  start  by studying  the individual's decision  problem when the following 
prices  are taken as given U) the wage  rate, (ii)  the price  of investing  in 
human  capital, and (iii) the interest rate.  These are assumed  constant  over 
time,  as theywill be in a steady state.  The introduction  of diminishing 
returns  to  point—in—time  production  is necessary for the individual's  human 15 
capital  investment  demand  to be well  defined.  Otherwise,  when the rates of 
return  to the accumulation  of physical and human capital  are identical (as 
they are in equilibrium)  the individual  allocations  across  these  two 
activities  are indeterminate. 
The individual  maximization  problem involves  choosing sequences  of 
consumption  {C} 
and human capital  investments  so as to maximize 
lifetime  utility (11.1),  subject  to an intertemporal  budget  constraint, 
o(T)j_t C 
B  +  [R(r))_t[wNM  1Ht1' 
where R(r)  is the market discount factor (R  1+r(1—r),  with  r(1—r) being the 
after—tax  real interest  rate)  and  B  is the level of initial financial 
assets.  The optimal  human capital  program is also constrained  by the 
evolution  equation  for human capital, [H+i-_HJ/H 
= ecIHfJHf) 
— 
There is a separation  of consumption  from production  decisions  in this 
ndel, so that preferences  do not influence  the rate of human  capital 
formation.  Consumption  growth occurs  at the familiar rate 
(C+1/C) 
= 
To examine the determination of the optimal growth rate, it is convenient 
to work  with the inverse of the adjustment technology, which states the 
inputs  required to yield a given flow of human capital  outputs.  Call this 
function  W, so that  W1— (l_6H)Ht)/Ht].  Substituting  this 
expression into  the lifetime  budget constraint  and maximizing  with respect to 
the human capital  stocks,  we are led to the following  efficiency  condition: 
wN = 
(R(r)_7M)pDW[7R_l+6HJ 
+ P'[7_l+S.).  (11L7) 16 
Implicitly,  this efficiency  condition  determines  a function  for the optimal 
growth rate of human capital  in the presence  of adjustment  costs," 
(111.8) 
The growth rate depends positively on  the wage rate w and negatively  on the 
price of investing in human capital  p)2  Since  investment  in human 
capital—like other investments—depends  negatively  on the interest  rate  R(r) 
and on the depreciation  rate of the capital  good H' 
the growth  rate  also 
depends  negatively  on these factors.  In addition,  it depends implicitly  on 
the parameters  of the e  function as in other  models  with adjustment  costs  to 
investment. 
This formulation  provides  a convenient  basis  for discussing  some 
- 
theoretical results from the labor  economics  literature—which generally 
views  the investment  process for human  capital  as untaxed—and to preview 
some  of our results in the general equilibrium  models  studied  below.  If we 
subject  labor  income  to a tax at rate r, then  the after—tax  wage  falls  to 
(1_Tw)w  so that one would expect  a slowdown  in human capital growth  from  this 
channel.  (These  implications  for human  capital accumulation  translate 
directly into implications  for the growth  of individual  income,  wNH). 
However,  there  may be a countervailing  effect from the influence  of taxation 
on the cost of investing  in human  capital.  If labor is the only input into 
human capital investment  and there is no direct  taxation  of the human  capital 
activity,  as in Rosen [1976]. then p is simply  proportional  to 
(l_y)w, 
so 
that there is a full offset  on the relative  price  v/p and, thus,  no effect  on 
the growth  rate.  In the alternative  specification  studied  by Hecknan  (1976), 
labor is only one of the factors  employed  in producing  new human capital,  so 
that there  is a smaller  countervailing  move in p from  and, thus,  there 17 
continues  to be a reduction  in the grow-th rate induced  by the tax increase 
even if  the human capital  investment  sector  is not taxed. 
III. 3  Prices  Facing  A Sa1l  Open Economy 
For the purpose of studying a small  open economy,  we need to explore the 
implications  of the production  structure  for the prices  w and p.  Thus in 
this section  we proceed part way to a full dynamic  general equilibrium,  but 
we retain  the assumption  that the interest  rate is exogenous.  We make the 
conventional assumptions  that there  is international  borrowing  and lending; 
trade in capital  and consumption goods;  and international iobility  of 
labor/human  capital.  We  also  assume that  all countries  follow  the "worldwide 
tax system" according to which agents  pay taxes in their  home country  on 
capital  income from foreign investments but receive a tax credit for any 
taxes paid abroad  on this income.'3 
The  Price of  Investment  in Human  Capital 
For a  small  economy facing a given  world interest rate, the cost  of 
producing  a marginal unit of  the human capital investment  good is independent 
of the level of investment,  since both of the production functions are 
constant returns to scale.  In discussing the implication of  analogous 
results  for specialization in the production of traded goods in a world 
economy,  Baxter [1988) notes that they fundamentally  derive from the 
nonsubstitution  theorem" of  Samuelsom  [1961)  and Mirrleeg [1969).  In our 
setting,  since human capital is not traded, a small open economy will not 
specialize if it grows, i.e., it will generally  produce both final product 
and human  capital investment.  But it still faces  a price of investing in 
human  capital that is determined  solely by domestic  technology and taxes along with  the world  interest  rate;  this  price is not influenced  by the 
domestic  economys choice between  production  of final output  and  human capital 
investment. 
Following  Baxter's  t1988] line  of argument,  the capital  intensity  in 
sector  1 is pinned  down  by the cost  of capital  under international  capital 
bility, Ki/(NiH)  cl[(R(r)._l+öKl)I(1._i-l)]  .  Hence, the real wage rate w 
is also determined  by these  variables,  as v 
(1—r1)D2F1C'c1,1).  Finally, 
with all of the input costs  determined,  the price  of the investment  good is 
given  by 
p = {(R(r)_1+S2)  VK  +  V  vN].I(1—r2),  (111.9) 
where the "unit factor demands'  and  are functions of the relative 
factor price for sector 2, w/[R(r)_1+S2] 
Ilications of Taxation 
With these  solutions in hand, we can return to the effects  of the 
analysis of taxation of sector 1  output—i.e.,  of a rise  in 
r1—discussed 
at 
the  end, of the previous section.  First,  if there is only labor  in the sector 
2  production  function  =  1),  so that  = 0,  then 
p=w/(1—r2)  and w/p 
(1—r2).  Hence,  in our CobbDouglas  setup, 2  1 will  be associated  with  no 
effect  of sector  I taxation on economic  growth.  However, sector  2 taxation 
will have a  negative influence  on growth. 
As stressed  by Heckman (1976L with 
VN<l,  a sector  1 tax increase  will 
reduce v/p and, hence,  reduce  the growth  rate of human capital.  (The  same 
logic  also implies  that this relative  price change  will generally  occur  when 
other  produced inputs  are used in the creation  of new human  capital; it can 
even  occur if these are flow inputs  rather  than capital  (5x2=1).) 
To some 19 
extent,  there will also  be factor  substitution  induced  by an increase  in 
that is, the input  ratio  will rise and an increase in the marginal  product 
of labor  viii occur.  This factor  substitution  effect  on the marginal  product 
of labor  will partly  mitigate  the direct  effect  of taxation. 
These general equilibrium adjustments are complex  and,  for this reason, 
we resort to siilations of parametric economies  in studying the effects of 
taxation in small open economies.  To maintain the link to individual 
consumer choice, we also discuss the adjustment in the prices w  and p so  that 
one can see how the equilibrium outcomes are decentralized. 
Table 2  reports the results of  some basic  experiments  with our small open 
economy setup, which holds fixed the rate of return R(r).  Prior to the 
fiscal change,  we assume  that the economy  has a growth rate of  2'!.  and the 
initial  configuration of tax rates is r1Tf.2O.  Further,  we  assume  that the 
economy does not trade with the rest of the world at these  tax rates.  We 
then explore the ilications of increasing  r1  to .3 and of increasing both 
and  r2 to .3. 
In our benchmark case,  we assume the parameter values discussed in 
section 111.1  above govern the economy.  We  also consider two other sets of 
parameter  values.  The first is a  'high 02"  case with 02  .95,  which is 
designed to illustrate the effects discussed earlier in this section.  The 
second is to bring in greater investment  adjustment  costs;  we  consider 0.25. 
In the benchmark case with 01=02=2/3, the 1O sector  1  tax increase—from 
r1=.20  to r1=.30—lowers  the growth  rate by over eight percentage points. 
(Even  a one percent increase in  the sector  1 tax rate lowers  growth  by two 
percentage  points).  This  slowdown is induced by a decline in v/p, the gross 
return to human capital investment from 14.92 to 13.97 percent per year. 20 
Taxing sector  2 at the same  higher rate (r1r2.30) leads to a complete 
shutdown of  human capital  investment 
('Yff  1—8H 
With a higher  labor share,  a2=.95, 
the effects of taxation  of sector  1 
are reduced,  but still  important: the increase  from r1.2O to r=.3O reduces 
the growth rate by 2.84%,  so that—starting from a 2% growth rate—the 
economy  would display negative  growth.  As discussed  previously,  with lover 
capital  input, the relative  price v/p is less sensitive  to taxation  in 
sector  1.  Taxing  both  sectors  at the same higher  rate 
(r1=r2=.30)  continues 
to lead to a complete  shutdown  of the growth process. 
With more sharply increasing  costs  of growth (9  smaller),  there is a 
smaller  magnitude impact:  growth  falls  by five  percent when the tax change 
is concentrated  on sector  I alone; previously,  in the benchmark  model,  it  - 
fell by over eight  percent. 
III. 4  The Closed  Economy General  Equ.ilibrium 
In the closed  economy  general  equilibrium,  the rate of return  exerts  a 
stabilizing  influence  relative  to the prior analysis.  In particular,  the 
increases  in the tax rate that lead  to lower  growth  bring about  a decline in 
the real rate of return, which  raises  the amount of human capital investment 
undertaken  at a given relative  price  v/p.  Therefore,  the effects  that we 
report  in this  section  are necessarily  smaller  than those in the prior 
section. 
Results on the effects  of taxation  on the growth  rate are provided  in 
Table  3:  in the benchmark  economy,  the basic  tax experiment  of raising  the 
sector  1 tax rate from T1.2O to r.30  leads  to a  one half  percent decrease 
in the growth  rate;  raising both  tax rates  by ten percent leads  to a. cut in 
the growth  rate of 1.51.  This  number  is broadly in line  with the growth 21 
effects that  we  found in the simple  endogenous growth model of section  2 
(which  implied a growth  rate decline  of 1.6%),  but it is slightly attenuated 
due to the presence of  'investment  adjustment costs"  to human capital 
formation  in the current  setup. 
The balance of the table reports a battery of sensitivity experiments 
abstracting from the transitional dynamics induced by  the tax increase  and 
focusing  on steady—state  effects.  First,  when we consider  the higher  labor's 
share  value,  we find that  the effects  of taxing  only sector  1 is 
sharply  limited:  instead of a  .5%  cut  in  the  growth  rate  there is a  .17, 
reduction.  This sensitivity  analysis suggests that it is important to obtain 
good  estimates of the relative  importance  of taxed factors and untaxed 
factors in the human capital  production process.  Second,  when we consider 
the Mincer [1974) value of depreciation  5H=012' the effects of a general tax 
increase  are attenuated,  falling from 1.5%  to .677,.  At the aggregate  level, 
the depreciation  rate on human capital involves  the training  of new 
population members; the retraining  of agents  reallocated  across  jobs;  and the 
continuing  development  of population  members staying  on the same job.  Our 
sensitivity  analysis  indicates  that it would  be valuable  to obtain  better 
measurements  of the depreciation  of human capital  associated  with  these 
activities.  Third, there  is a  major influence  of the intertemporal 
elasticity  of substitution  (1/u) on the rate of economic  growth.  Our value 
of a5  is  only about  halfway from  our benchmark  of a=1 to the largest  values 
found  by Hall [1988), but it is nevertheless  sufficient  to substantially 
mitigate  the effect  of taxation  on economic  growth.  Fourth,  we experimented 
with values  of the investment  technology  parameter,  reducing it to 9.25,  As 
in  the small  open economy,  the growth  rate declines  relative  to the benchmark 22 
experiment  but  this influence  is smaller than that of the other sensitivity 
experiments. 
From this  battery of results,  we conclude  that taxation may  affect  the 
growth  rate in a  quantitatively  important  way, but that the  magnitude of this 
influence  depends,  not  surprisingly,  on  the production  and tax structure. 
IV.  e1fare Ilicatioms of Taxation 
In the models of  sections  II and III we examined  the effects  on real 
activity  of an increase  in the income  tax rate  from 20% to 30%.  In this 
section  we evaluate  the predictions  of our  models  for the welfare cost of 
this tax increase.  Our objective  is to illustrate  the general  principle that 
there  are larger  welfare effects in endogenous  growth  models than in the 
basic neoclassical  model.  As in the previous  sections  we assume  that the tax 
proceeds are rebated in a lump—sum  fashion  in order  to isolate  the 
substitution  effects  of taxation. 
Method of policy  analysis 
The method  that we employ  is based on Lucas [1988a]  and works  as 
follows.15  Denote  by {C}0  the consumption  path associated  with the steady 
state of an economy  with a 201 tax rate,  and let  demote  the path that 
results after  an unanticipated  increase  its the tax rate from 20% to 30%.  The 
welfare loss  associated  with  this tax increase  is the number  such  that 
U({C}0).  (IV.1) 
Since C  grows  at a constant  rate,  is determined  so that consumers  are 
indifferent  between Ci) an increase  in the tax rate  to 30% and (ii) a 23 
situation  in which  the tax rate  remains at 207.  but their consumption  level is 
reduced by 1OO7. in every  period. 
IV.  1  The Basic Ieoclassical  Xodel 
In response to an increase in the income  tax rate from 207. to 30%, our 
parameterized  version of the  neoclassical  model  predicts that steady—state 
capital falls  by 18.2%  and consumption  declines  by 3.67..  As Judd [1987) and 
Jorgenson  and Yun [1988) have stressed,  it is inappropriate  to evaluate  tax 
policies solely  on the basis  of these long  run effects.  In fact the welfare 
cost of taxation  would be independent  of preferences  in the neoclassical 
growth  model if only steady—state  comparisons  were  utilized.  However,  the 
decline in steady—state  consumption  gives  us an upper  bound to the welfare 
cost associated  with the tax increase.  Since  consumption  is higher  along  the 
transition  path than it is in the new steady  state, the welfare cost is lower 
than  the cost  associated  with an immediate,  permanent  3.6% drop in 
consumption. 
The first line of Table  4 shows  that,  taking  into account  the entire 
transition  path,  the welfare cost of raising the income  tax rate from  20'!.  to 
30'f. in the benchmark  model is 1.67..  That is, the tax rate increase  is 
equivalent (in utility  terms) to an immediate  1.67. downward shift  in the 
steady—state  consumption  path. 
We studied  the sensitivity  of this welfare  cost to intertemporal 
elasticities  of substitution  different  from  the benchmark  value of  one.  When 
the intertenporal  elasticity  of substitution  in consumption  is increased 
(i.e.  is reduced),  the initial. jump  in consumption  illustrated  in Figure  1 
is magnified  and the welfare  cost increased.  For example,  when  1/2, the 
welfare cost is 1.717..  Symmetrically,  when  is increased,  the welfare  cost 24 
falls:  when  2, the welfare  cost  is 1.46%.  The intuition  behind  these 
results is familiar from discussions  of the welfare cost of taxation  in 
partial equilibrium  (e.g., Nusgrave  and  Xusgrave  t1980), page 310)): 
increasing  the willingness  of agents  to substitute  across  goods  increases 
their  response  to the tax distortion  and leads  to a higher  excess  burden  of 
taxation. 
IV. 2  The Sile  Endogenous  Growth !odel 
In  the simple endogenous  growth model of section II there are no 
transitional dynamics.  A permanent  change in the tax rate implies  an 
iediate shift in the level  of the consution path and a permanent change 
in the rate of growth  of consumption, For our benchmark  case  of  unitary 
elasticity  of  substitution,  increasing  r from 20% to 30%  results in a 1.63% 
reduction  in the growth  rate.  As sketched  in Figure 2,  the reduction in 
rates  of growth  induced by taxation  is accompanied  by an increase  in the 
initial  level  of consumption. This effect  on consumption  is typically 
large—with  1 there is a 36.2%  increase  in initial  consumption.  Yet, 
with lower growth  due to taxation,  welfare  unambiguously  declines in  this 
economy.  Table  4 shows  that this  economy  predicts dramatically  higher values 
for the welfare  cost of taxation  than  the neoclassical  model.  Fundamentally, 
this difference  reflects the fact  that the long  run growth  rate is affected 
in the linear  technology  economy  but not  in the neoclassical  model. 
However, one aspect  of our calibration  procedure contributed  to the 
extraordinarily  high welfare  cost  predicted  by the  model.  By requiring  that 
the discount  rate  fi be such  that the economy  chooses  to grow at 2% when the 
income  tax  rate is 20% we endowed  this artificial  economy with extremely 
patient agents (the  value  of fi we  adopted  was .9884).  The life—time  utility 25 
of these agents  was severely  affected  when  the tax rate increase  reduced  the 
returns  to private acculation  of capital and hence the rate of  growth. 
If  we  calibrate the model  by requiring that without taxes  (r=O)  the 
economy  grows at 27..  the welfare effect is 16.3%,  which is much lower than 
the number  we reported in Table 4 but still significantly greater than the 
1.67, welfare cost  for the neoclassical  model,  In this case the j3 adopted is 
.9576 which coincides with the discount factor used in our benchmark 
parameterization  of the neoclassical  model. 
As  in the neoclassical  model, the welfare cost of taxation  depends on the 
extent  of inter-temporal  substitution  in consumption.  When  2, for 
example,  the effect  on the growth rate is  .82'!,  and the welfare cost is 63%. 
When  1/2,  the  effect  on  the growth  rate is 3.2'!,  and the welfare cost is 
727,. 
IV. 3  The Two—Sector  Endogenous  Growth odel 
When we consider  tax increases  that are  uniformly levied  on both sectors 
I and 2,  the two—sector  endogenous  growth model  has positive implications 
that are broadly the same  as the simple model of  endogenous economic  growth. 
Only the existence  of  "adjustment  costs"  alters these  implications,  yielding 
slightly  smaller  growth effects. 
In terms of welfare effects  of uniform sectoral taxation, the final line 
of entries in Table 4 makes  clear that  the welfare effects  are also  very 
close to those we found for the simple model.  The cost  of a 10%  increase in 
taxation is around  60% of  consumption.  As in the simple endogenous growth 
model, the growth  and welfare effects are increased (decreased) if 
individuals are more  (less) willing to substitute over time.  For  o'  1/2, 26 
the growth rate falls by  2.97% and the welfare cost measure is 76%.  For o = 
2, the growth rate falls  by .77%  and the welfare cost  is 58%. 
Other  tax experiments—such as taxing  only sector  1 or considering 
different  labor  share in the two sectors—generally ily  transitional 
dynamics  which  requires that we explicitly  solve  for colete equilibrium 
paths as in the basic  neoclassical  model.  We plan to pursue these 
experiments  in our future  research. 
V.  Conclusions 
In this paper  we proposed a model  of economic  growth in which  a 
corehensive  measure of "technical  progress"  is made endogenous  along  the 
lines  suggested  by Uzawa [1965]  ,  Lucas  [1988b] and Rebelo [1987].  By 
interpreting this corehensive measure as social investment  in "human 
capital,"  our analysis  provides a  potentially  valuable  formalization  of the 
ideas of Schultz t196i,  i981] on economic  development.  Using this 
interpretation,  we build explicit thcrofoundations for a two  sector  model  of 
endogenous economic growth.  When  we calibrate our model with  parameter 
values  that accord  with the U.S. long  run experience,  we reach  three  major 
conclusions,  as follows. 
First,  we find  that public  policies  can exert a quantitatively large 
influence  on the average growth  rates of economies operating in isolation. 
Policies  can display these effects because  they influence  private incentives 
for accumalation  of physical and human  capital  as in Schultz [1981] 
Further,  these incentive  effects  of taxation  are reinforced in open  economies 
that have access  to international  capital markets.  In both open and closed 
economies,  relatively  small changes  in tax rates can lead countries  to 
stagnate  or even regress  for lengthy  periods,  if these  policies eliminate 27 
incentives for growth.  Our explanation  of  no—growth  steady states" 
contrasts with that offered  by Becker,  Murphy and Tamura [1988)  and Azariadis 
and Drazen [1988).  In those analyses,  aspects  of the technology  give  rise to 
multiple  steady  states  so that economies  with different  initial conditions 
may converge  to steady states  with different  rates  of growth even in the 
absence of cross—country  heterogeneity  in public  policy. 
Second,  the effects  of taxation  depend  importantly  on aspects of the 
production  technology  for new human  capital,  about  which there  is presently 
insufficient  information. In  part,  this reflects  the fact that our human 
capital  good is a composite  of many different  activities  and that  we have not 
taken a sufficiently  precise stand  on its essential  content.  On the other 
hand, there  has been little  research  in labor  economics  since  that of Rosen 
[1976] and Hecan  [1976] on the  parameters  of individual  technologies  for 
investment in human capital.  Our research indicates  that  macroeconomic 
policy  analysis  would be aided by additional  microeconomic  measurement. 
Third,  since  policies  have the potential  to influence  the growth  rate in 
dels  with endogenous  long run growth,  there is generally  a  much larger 
quantitative  influence  of policies  on welfare  than in the neoclassical  model 
where  the growth  rate is governed  by the exogenous  rate of technical 
progress.  Some  experiments comparing neoclassical  and endogenous  growth 
dels suggest  that this difference  can  be quantitatively  important. 
In suary, with  the results of the present  paper,  we find new promise 
for the hypotheses  of Schultz  [1981) that incentive  effects of policy  can 
influence  economic  activity—taxation can readily lead to development  traps 
and growth  miracles.  Models  of endogenous  economic  growth  thus provide  new 
analytical  paths for studying  old problems  in the economics  of development. 28 
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Footnotes 
°This paper  is a substantially  revised version  of one prepared  for the 
conference  on  'The Problem of Development"  held at the State  University  of 
New York at Buffalo in May  1988.  The analysis  of the two sector  model in our 
work, particularly in its open economy  versions,  draws  heavily on some  recent 
research  by Marianne Baxter [1988L  We also  thank  her for pointing out the 
relationship between our model building activity  and the arguments of TW. 
Schultz [19811.  Finally, we have benefited from coents by  Stanley Fischer 
and Arnold  Harberger—who  discussed the paper at the Buffalo conference—as 
well as by Kenneth Judd,  who  discussed the paper at the Summer  Econometric 
Society meetings.  Support from  the National  Science  Foundation  is gratefully 
acknowledged. 
1This class of models is very large, including structures with many 
capital stocks  in the growth "core" and with nonreproducible  factors outside 
the growth 'core'  (Rebelo  [1987]);  or with steady  states  that are only 
asymptotically  obtained (Jones  and Manuelli [1990]). 
2Lucas  [1980)  provides cogent  arguments for  combining aggregate and 
microeconomic evidence to restrict dynamic  macroeconomic  models of business 
fluctuations.  Other applications  of this strategy include Mehra and 
Prescott's  [1985]  work  on asset  pricing  and recent work  on real business 
cycles,  as surveyed  by King, Plosser  and Rebelo [1988a,b). 
3As  is  conventional  with constant  elasticity  specifications,  we assume 
that o-=1  corresponds  to logarithmic momentary  utility. 
4A neoclassical  production  function  is constant returns to scale,  concave, 
twice continuously  differentiable,  satisfies  the Inada  conditions,  and 
specifies  that each production  factor is essential  in  production. 34 
5Vith a twenty  percent tax rate on final output,  this  nunber is consistent 
with the 6.5X figure used  in King  and  Rebelo  11989],  Let the before—tax 
marginal product of capital be MPK  and the alter tax marginal product be 
(l—r)  NFL  The rate of return to capital  investment  is then (1—r) XPK —  6.  If 
we take the before-tax rate of return, 1(PK —  5,  to  be .065, then using 6.10 
and r.2,  we arrive at an after—tax rate of return of .8(165) — .10  .032. 
The equivalence between output and input taxation under  constant returns 
to scale is discussed by Break  11974]  and XcLure  11975];  Atkinson  and 
Stiglitz 11980]  provide a convenient suary. 
7The average tax rate is clearly a crude  proxy for the income tax rate in 
our model but we view it as a natural starting point given that it is very 
hard to map the complex  tax systems that  most  countries adopt  into stylized 
descriptions  that can be used in calibration  exercises  such as  ours.  For 
general  discussions  of these difficulties  and suggestions for improvements  on 
our proxy see Braun 11989], NcGratten  11989] and Wynne 11988]. 
8mese  two requirements  imply values  of A and  as follows.  First, the 
value of A is .1650, since  the before—tax  interest  rate is 6.5  and the 
depreciation  rate is 10.  The value  of /3 is then given  by the equation 
= 1,  where the alter—tax  interest  rate,  R(r),  is  3.2'!.. 
An  important  assumption  in our  approach is that the changes in 
productivity  susasarized by  the evolution  of the composite  human capital good 
are embodied in the representative  worker.  See Romer (1986,  1988b]  for 
analyses  that do not rely  on this embodiment  assumption. 
10By Dg(x),  we mean the derivative  of the function  g with  respect to x; 
correspondingly,  D2g(x)  demotes  the second  derivative. 
11The details  of this  procedure  are reported in Appendix  A 35 
121t  also  depends  positively  on the number  of hours,  N,  which  is exogenous 
in our model.  In economies  with variable labor supply, therefore,  policy may 
affect  human capital accumnilation via the supply  of labor,  a channel  not 
considered  here. 
13The U.S.,  Japan  and the U.K. follow  this tax system.  An alternative  tax 
convention  is the "territorial  system"  which exempts  from taxes all capital 
income earned  abroad.  See Swenson [1989]  for a detailed  discussion. 
14TO  compute  the closed  economy  general equilibrium,  essentially,  we add 
the requirement  that  R  1 to the preceding  analysis.  See appendix 
'5This method is closely related  to that  used by Hamilton  in his [1987] 
study of the effects of taxation on risk taking.  Our measure of the welfare 
effects of taxation  would not  be appropriate if  we were addressing normative 
questions such as the design  of  an optimal tax system,  since we do not  impose 
that the tax revenue mist be the same  in the two  regimes  compared.  If this 
restriction were  imposed, our welfare measure would  coincide with the 
compensating variation used  by Hamilton  [1987]  .  We  thank Ken  Judd for making 
us  aware of Hamiltons work. TABLE  1: 
Parameters for Tax Erporinents  in Two Sector  Endogenous  Growth  odel 
ode1 Coonent:  Parameter Values  Studied: 
Sector  1: ConsutionJPhysica1  Investment 




Sector  2: Human  Capital Investment 
(111.2)  F2  A2X2 (N2E)U2:  2 
* 
a2  {2/3,.95} 
Evolution  of Physical  Capital  Stocks 
(111.3)  jt  1  X2 
Evolution  of Human Capital Stocks 
(111.4)  HrHt  65Hz: 




After4ax Real  Interest  Rate  R(r)  1032 
Real  Grovth  Rate  1.02 
Sectoral  Tax Rates  .20  T2  .20 
When  ltiple  parameter  values are given, e.g.,  a2  {2/3.95}, the initial 
value  is the benchmerk  and the subsequent  one is used  in sensitivity 
analysis.  Parameters  indicated by an asterisk (s) are deterined  so  that the 
closed  economy general equilibrium produces the initial  values  of interest 
and growth  rates at initial tax rates. 
The  functions  u(c) and O(IHIH)  are given in text  equations  (11.1) and (111.6) 
respectively.  The relevant parameters  follow the  principal  argument, i.e., 
u(c;cr)  and in 
TABLE  2: 
Tax  Effects on Growth Rate 
Two Sector  Endogenous  Growth  Model 
OPEN  ECONOMY  VERSION 
Parameter 
Choices: 
Tax  Growth 
Rate Increases  Rate  Decrease 
x 
F1  F2 
Benchmark  10  0  8.6 
1.0  10  12.0* 
Higher 2  10  0  2.8 
10  10  12.0* 
Lover 9  10  0  5.0 
10  10  9.5 
Those model parameters  not changed  in the experiments  take the benchmark 
values listed in  Table  1.  An asterisk  Cs) indicates  that  the economy 
contracts  at the maxiim  rate TABLE 3: 
Tax Effects on Grovth Rate 
in To Sector Endogenous Groth Model 




Choices:  Rate 
Growth 
Rate  Decrease 
% 
1  •2 
Benchmark  10  10  152 
Benchmark  10  0  .52 
Higher a2 
10  0  .11 
Higher a  10  10  31 
Lover  10  10  67 
Lover  8  10  10  1.38 
Benchmark and  alternative parameters  used in these experiments are given in 
Table 1. TABLE  4 
Welfare  Effects  of Tax Increase in  Three Dynaic  Models 
Initial  Growth Rate 





Basic  Neoclassical  Model  6.6  0 
Sile  Endogenous  Growth  Model  36.2  1.63 
Two—Sector  Endogenous  Growth  Model  34.5  1.53 
The results reported  here  are for the benchmark versions  of each del; 
parameter  choices are discussed in section II of the text for the first two 





















































































































































































































































































 Appendix  A 
Calibration  of Two Sector F.ndogenous Growth Model 
This appendix discusses the formal structure of the two—sector  endogenous 
growth del outlined in the main text, as well as our procedures  for 
calibrating its steady state  and exploring policy implications. 
The  representative  agent  in this economy solves the dynaxic optimization 
problem 
Max  /3t u(C)  t=o 
subject to the accuimilation constraints 
—,  £'  t+1K't  Xt 
Ht+i  e(IH/H)H 
the resource  constraints 
C 
+  'iiit' Nit) 
+ Tit 
'Ht  f12F2(2,  M2) 
4 
and the factor  allocation  constraints 
Nit 
+ 
M2t ￿ t A—2 
+ K2 
To  analyze equilibrium behavior, we form the Lagrangian 
t 
£  =  u(C)  t=O 
+  A[F1 
+ Tit 
+  (i_ÔK)Kt 
— Kt+i 
—  C] 
_  £F  +1 
+  A2[e( 
2  2t  2t)H  +  (l_o.)H 
— 







The efficiency  conditions take the following forms.  For consumption, we have 
the familiar requirement that 
tDu(c) =  Ai. 
For the cross—sectoral allocations  of factor stocks,  we have the four 
conditions 
itlDiFl(it Mit) A—3 
AitUiD2Fixit. 
A2nen2D1r2K2. N2t) Kt 
Mt 









—  ______________ 
and the transversality conditions 
1 i  m 
1 i. m  A2tH+i  t+T 
Finally,  we have the four resource constraints 
=  fiFit 








Steady State  Requirements 
Consolidating  the preceding  conditions,  we find  that the steady  state  is 
described  by 
(SS1)  = 1/(i+r). 
(SS2)  (1+r)  + 
f21D1F1(K1/M1,  1) 
(SS3)  (1+r)  = 
[(l—ö) 
+ i DO 
f22D2F2 
+ 9 
—(F/H)  DO] 
D1F1(K1/M1,  1) 




D2F2(K2/M2,  1) 
M 
(SS5)  I 
(SS6)  = (g)() + 
(SS7)  1511 
K  H 
(SS8)  = F2(-,  1) A—S 
14 
(SS9)  ()  F1(K/fl, 1)() 
(SS1O)  — H 
+ 
This system  is 10 equations  in  the 10 unovns ,  (1+r),  (K1/141) 
(K/NH), (IE/H),  (Y/NH) and (C/NH). 
Cal  ibrat  ion 
For the purpose of  determining the parameters  of the steady state to 
tcb  observed average growth and real interest rates, we proceed as follows. 
Firat  we postulate CES forms for the F  and F. functions  so  that F 
1  2  2 
—pi  P1 •4/P. 
F1(K1, N1; A ,  p)  A1[(1-a)K1 
+  1 
Then,  we  compute the steady  state according  to the following  algorithm: 
Step 1:  Given  A1  1  and  invert (1+r)  D1F1(K1/M1,1) 
+ l—6  to 
obtain  steady  state 
K1/141 ratio using (SS2). 
Step 2:  Given  a,  p1 and p2 
calculate 
K2/142 
from  requirement  that 
rgina1  ratez  of transformation  are equated  in the two sectorz 
using (SS4) 
Step  3:  Given the parameters  of e  function—the  coefficients  developed  in 
Appendix  A (i.e., 0  and  A3)——compute  (IEJH) 
consistent  with specified 
7using  (SS7). A—6 
Step  4:  Given  the results  of  the preceding  steps,  (SS3) permits—with 
specification  of 
I12—solution  for the parameter  A2 
A  r+EH — 
[e(IE/E)  D8(IE/H)(IE/H.)1 
2 
ND8(IE/E)fI2[D2F2(x2/12,  1)1A21 
Step 5:  Use (SS8) to coute  the fraction  of time in efficiency  units 
allocated  to  investment  in human  capital,  given previously 
determined 
(IE/H) and (K21M2) with specified  N. 
(M2/NH) 
Step  6:  Coute M1/NH  1—(X2/N1{),  using (SS5). 
Step  7:  Coute  = F2E(1), 1; A1,  a, p1).(), using (SS8) and 
the results above. 
Step  8:  Coute  =  +  using (SS6) and the results  above. 
Step  9:  Compute  =  —  +  (1—8),  using (SS9) and the results 
above. 
Step  10: Compute  3 = 7I(1+r) using (SS1) and the  results  above. 